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Explaining the dog that does not bark: 
Why do some localities in Turkey remain resistant to Islamist political mobilization?
Evren Celik Wiltse, South Dakota State University
Introduction:
Most studies on political Islam in Turkey have embraced 
a comprehensive, national level of analysis . From the 
classic “center-periphery” paradigm (Mardin, 1973) to 
recent works that explain the rise of political Islam (Gulalp, 
2001; Arat, 2005; Turam, 2007; Gumuscu, 2010) or its 
downfall (Tugal, 2015), scholars focus mostly on macro 
transformations . These include socio-economic changes 
since the 1980s, new state-society dynamics, the rise 
of a “strong devout bourgeoisie” and successful bottom 
up mobilization efforts of political Islam in large urban 
centers . Few researchers (Turam, 2007; Tugal 2015) expand 
their analysis to include the transnational outreach of the 
Turkish Islamist experience . 
In terms of their methods, many of the studies that explain 
political Islam in Turkey include key explanatory variables 
on a national scale . The Turkish state’s rigidly secularist 
disposition since the early Republic, effective mobilization 
of Islamist movements/parties as a reaction to top-down 
secularism, rise of conservative business networks since 
the neoliberal tide of the 1980s, expansion of civil society, 
urban marginalization, and women’s organizations all offer 
excellent explanations for the strengthening of Islamist 
movements and parties in Turkey . 
While most of these studies successfully explain the rise 
of Islamist movements, many of them are not particularly 
sensitive to local variation and agency .1 Even ethnographic 
studies that try to reach out to the marginalized sectors 
1  For an example of research that is particularly sensitive to local 
characteristics, see “Islamic Calvinists: Change and Conservatism in 
Central Anatolia” by the European Stability Initiative http://www .
esiweb .org/pdf/esi_document_id_69 .pdf Ironically, the local networks 
and bonds of trust in Kayseri province that are much praised in this 
report later became a serious liability . When the ruling AK Party and 
its once closest ally, the Gulenist religious network, parted their ways, 
businesses in Kayseri became targets and were overtaken by publicly 
appointed trustees .
(White, 2013; Tugal, 2015) focus on the periphery of the 
largest metropolis, Istanbul – Umraniye and Sultanbeyli 
respectively . 
Despite these compelling studies, an intriguing puzzle 
remains: why do certain pockets of Turkey seem relatively 
immune to the rising religious political wave? 
This paper tries to explain the relative failure of Islamist 
politics in certain localities of Turkey, with reference 
to their distinct regional socio-cultural and economic 
characteristics . As Marschall  Shalaby and Konak Unal 
demonstrate, local politics is not merely a venue for 
redistributive policy . Issues of identity and morality 
also play an important part, for they constrain “mayors’ 
ability to govern, manage conflict, and win elections .” 
(Marschall, Shalaby and Konak Unal, 2017:2) Briefly, this 
paper argues that having a distinct local socio-cultural 
identity and certain economic means to sustain it can 
make communities relatively immune to the inroads of 
Islamist politics . Due to methodological and practical 
complexities of accurately gauging the power of relatively 
non-transparent Islamic movements, electoral support 
for religious parties is used as a proxy in this paper . In 
addition to election data, the paper utilizes qualitative data 
from fieldwork conducted in Edirne and Kirklareli in the 
northwest, and Hatay in south-central Turkey .
Can a secular versus Muslim lens capture the whole 
picture? 
“At one level, Turkish society appears to be divided 
into secular and Muslim positions whose proponents 
are circling the wagons and demanding ideological 
and behavioral purity from their members. But neither 
term –secular or Muslim- does justice to the variety of 
the possible positions and their sometimes surprising 
combinations.” (White, 2013: 10)
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After each election in Turkey, particularly since 2011, the 
predominant interpretation seems to be the “polarization” 
between modern, secular coastal cities against the 
conservative, Muslim core . Consolidation of multiple 
center-right and religious-right parties (ANAP, DYP, Genc, 
and Refah) under the Justice & Development Party (AKP), 
and left parties (DSP and CHP) under the Republican 
People’s Party (CHP) helps breed this perception . Since 
ultra-nationalists and Kurds are under constant existential 
crisis due to the 10 percent electoral threshold, scholars 
argue that Turkey has gradually replaced its chronic 
electoral volatility with a dominant party system, wherein 
the Islamist party takes the center stage and seculars 
take the main opposition seat . (Carkoglu, 2011) While 
Izmir symbolizes the stereotypical voter profile of the 
secularists with its modern, educated and elite outlook, 
places like Konya, Kayseri or Ümraniye symbolize the core 
constituencies of the religious political bloc . This paper tries 
to peel away some of these dichotomous assumptions about 
the secular and religious voters, elites and counter-elites of 
Turkey, by zooming in on three specific localities . (Map 1) 
Both Edirne and Kirklareli in the northwest are known to 
be historical strongholds of CHP . However, unlike other 
CHP strongholds, such as cosmopolitan Izmir, Eskisehir, or 
Ankara-Cankaya, boasting multiple universities, educated 
and affluent upper-middle classes, Edirne and Kirklareli 
are relatively small, economically less developed, and 
socially more parochial cities . In their region 45 percent 
of women active in the labor force (ages 15 to 49) work 
in the agricultural sector, which is 5 percent higher than 
the national average . (TNSA 2008: 51) Given their large 
rural populations that make a living from subsistence 
agriculture, it is difficult to paint these localities as the hubs 
of Turkey’s secular elites . 
A third province included in this study is Hatay located 
in south-central Turkey with Syria on one side and the 
Mediterranean on the other . Hatay contains a medley of 
cultures, religions, and ethnicities . Housing the historic 
cities of Antakya (Antioch) and Iskenderun, Hatay prides 
itself for being the “cradle of the three Abrahamic religions .” 
It stands out for having Turkey’s only Armenian village, 
Vakifli, located on the legendary Musa Dagh .(Eski, 2015) 
Numerous holy sites of Islam and Christianity are scattered 
across the province . In the old city center of Antakya, one 
can see insignias on the facades of old stone houses that 
display the profession and faith of the residents . This is 
probably the only city in Turkey where one can hear church 
bells ringing regularly during the daytime . Yet it is not a 
typical secular/elite province such as Ankara, Izmir, or 
Eskisehir either . Compared to these cities, Hatay is much 
more religious and much less affluent . (see Table 1 below)
When we look at the voting patterns of these three 
provinces since 1991, we can observe certain variation that 
Source: www.d-maps.com
Map 1: Administrative Units in Turkey
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Table 1: Ranking of Turkey’s Provinces According to GDP per capita (2014)
1 İstanbul 21 EDIRNE* 41 Aydın 61 Malatya
2 Kocaeli 22 Kayseri 42 Amasya 62 Giresun
3 Ankara 23 Erzincan 43 Gaziantep 63 Ordu
4 Tekirdağ 24 Rize 44 Zonguldak 64 Tokat
5 Bilecik 25 Tunceli 45 Sivas 65 Ardahan
6 İzmir 26 Artvin 46 Afyon 66 Iğdır
7 Bolu 27 Balıkesir 47 Aksaray 67 Kilis
8 Bursa 28 Trabzon 48 Gümüşhane 68 Adıyaman
9 Antalya 29 Uşak 49 Kırşehir 69 Mardin
10 Eskişehir 30 İçel 50 Niğde 70 Bingöl
11 Yalova 31 Karabük 51 Bartın 71 Diyarbakır
12 KIRKLARELI* 32 Isparta 52 Çorum 72 Kars
13 Muğla 33 Konya 53 Sinop 73 Siirt
14 Çanakkale 34 Kastamonu 54 Elazığ 74 Bitlis
15 Denizli 35 Kütahya 55 HATAY* 75 Şırnak
16 Karaman 36 Kırıkkale 56 Yozgat 76 Muş
17 Manisa 37 Çankırı 57 Osmaniye 77 Batman
18 Sakarya 38 Adana 58 Kahramanmaraş 78 Hakkari
19 Düzce 39 Samsun 59 Erzurum 79 Van
20 Burdur 40 Nevşehir 60 Bayburt 80 Şanlıurfa
            81 Ağrı
Source: TUIK. Calculated by the author based on Turkish Statistical Institute data on  
GDP of each province and the population of each province for 2014. 
sets them apart from national trends . Chart 1 displays the 
support for religious parties, including the ruling AKP and 
its predecessors . Despite the progressively increasing vote 
share of the Islamist parties across Turkey, it shows that 
these three provinces consistently rank below the national 
average . Average support for the Islamist parties is about 
4 percent lower in Hatay, and nearly 20 percent lower in 
both Edirne and Kirklareli . 
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Chart 1: Percentage of AKP Votes in General Elections 
in Edirne, Kirklareli and Hatay, 1991-2015: 
Source: Compiled by the author from the Election  
Archives of the Turkish Supreme Election Council (YSK) 
www.ysk.gov.tr
When we look at the support for the CHP, variation of 
these three provinces becomes even more striking . All 
three provinces score much higher than the national 
average since 1991 . On average, CHP receives 10 percent 
more votes in Hatay, and around 14-15 percent more votes 
in Edirne and Kirklareli . 
Chart 2: Percentage of CHP Votes in General Elections 
in Edirne, Kirklareli and Hatay, 1991-2015: 
Source: Compiled by the author from the Election  
Archives of the Turkish Supreme Election Council (YSK) 
www.ysk.gov.tr
Why swim against the tide?
The elite/secular center versus Islamist periphery template 
does not explain the strong support for the opposition 
CHP in small towns and villages of Edirne, Kirklareli, 
and Hatay, which are full of small-scale merchants and 
subsistence farmers . The majority of the population 
in these provinces is far from being highly educated, 
secular elites . In fact, both Trakya and Hatay are famous 
for their fertile agricultural lands, and outside of a few 
urban centers, there is also a significant portion of rural 
population . Nearly half of economically active women 
work in agriculture . The puzzle is: why would majority of 
these less privileged, rural residents turn their backs to 
the tangible benefits that come with a vote for the ruling 
Islamist party? Why do they insist on voting for the secular 
opposition? 
Teune (1995: 14) argues that, “local structures and cultures 
are less amenable to change than are higher levels of 
political organization .” Constitutional amendments, 
bureaucratic or economic reforms are much easier to 
execute form the center, in comparison to breaking away 
the “familiar dominance of political influence” in the 
periphery . Consequently, we should not be too surprised to 
see these provinces in the periphery resisting the Islamist 
political wave that is impacting the metropolitan centers of 
Turkey . The type of morality and identity politics in which 
Islamist parties engage elsewhere, particularly in large 
urban centers, might undermine their success in these 
localities in the periphery of Turkey . 
Religion is the crucial mortar that holds together the 
social fabric in all three of these provinces . However, the 
ways in which these communities incorporate religion are 
not necessarily the same way as many political Islamists . 
Compared to other parts of Turkey, religiosity in Trakya 
stands out in several aspects . First and foremost, the 
gender gap in Trakya is not as wide as the rest of the 
nation . Women and men work in the fields together and 
celebrate together in weddings and holidays . On average, 
more than 35 percent of women in the region between the 
ages of 15 and 49 are active members of the labor force as 
of 2008, this is 5 percent higher than the Turkish national 
average . (TNSA 2008) Marriage among relatives, including 
distant cousins and even close neighbors, is strictly 
forbidden . (Yedi kuşak akrabayla evlilik olmaz .) (Celik 
Wiltse 2014-16) This social norm eases the tension among 
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sexes, making socialization much easier since they do not 
consider each other as potential spouses, or haram in all 
contexts . 
Unlike other parts of rural Turkey, strict public segregation 
of sexes is neither practical, nor enforced in Trakya . Given 
the low population density and record low birth rates,2 men 
and women need to work side-by-side in the region . Women 
can work alone as day laborers, without being shunned by 
their communities . This relative gender parity also extends 
into property rights . Turkish civil code grants equal share 
of inheritance to all siblings, yet in most parts of Anatolia 
brothers are favored over sisters . However in Trakya, my 
respondents emphatically stated that all siblings get equal 
share, regardless of gender . (Celik Wiltse 2014-16) 
Secondly, there is the unique way in which this devout 
Sunni Muslim population practices its religion and 
tradition . Complying with duties and transmitting them to 
the next generations are important goals that shape day-to-
day conduct . However, they also insist on practicing these 
traditions the way their ancestors did, and react negatively 
to external influences . (Atalarımızdan, dedelerimizden 
gördüğümüz gibi ibadet ederiz .) (Celik Wiltse 2014-16) 
In her impressive ethnographic work, Kimberly Hart 
captures the clash between different ways in which 
Islam can be experienced in any given community . The 
unorthodox Islam takes the glorified Ottoman past as 
its source of legitimacy, whereas the more modern and 
politicized form of Islam looks at the future to establish 
its ideal Islamic society . Hart compares and contrasts 
two villages in western Turkey . The first adheres to more 
traditional, heterodox practices, while the other one, 
influenced by the Islamic movements and brotherhoods 
2  Almost all surveys highlight low fertility rates in Trakya . TUIK data 
on population density in 2016 shows that Edirne and Kirklareli have 
nearly half the population density, compared to the Turkish average . 
(TR average, 104; Edirne, 66; Kirklareli, 56) . Edirne also scores negative 
population growth in four of the last nine years that are recorded . 
Hatay on the other hand shows robust expansion with double-digit 
growth rates, and is one of the more densely populated provinces with 
a density rating of 267 in 2016 . (Turkey average: 104) . TNSA -13 survey 
results also show Trakya region having the highest rate (30%) of nuclear 
families in Turkey without children . (Average for Turkey is 17 .9%) 
p .20 . http://www .hips .hacettepe .edu .tr/tnsa2013/rapor/TNSA2013_
ilerianaliz .pdf
(particularly by Süleymancılar), tries to “purify” religion 
from these backwards influences and seeks legitimacy in a 
future, Islamist form of polity . (Hart, 2013: 153-4) 
An overwhelming majority of rural Trakya probably 
resembles the first village in Hart’s classification . They are 
proud of their Ottoman heritage, and religious ceremonies 
harken back to that golden era . (Hurriyet, 2016) Similar 
to Hart’s villagers, “they share a patriotic dedication to the 
nation-state, and an uncritical merging of Turkish ethno-
national and Sunni Islamic identities .” (Hart, 2013: 23) 
Patriotism and discretion towards national institutions 
are noticeable in people’s daily habits as well . Across 
Trakya, there seems to be greater reverence for the public 
TV channels (TRT) . The Directorate of Religious Affairs 
(Diyanet) serves as the sole arbitrator on religious matters, 
particularly among the middle aged and older generations . 
In almost every house, there is a Diyanet calendar used 
frequently as a reference, and most people tune in to 
TRT for news and Ramadan programs . In personal 
conversations, residents express reverence towards their 
imam, a civil servant appointed by the Diyanet and are 
decidedly negative about “outsiders” who come to preach 
them about “their own religion .” (Celik Wiltse, 2014-16) 
In sum, the pious rural population of Trakya adheres to 
a more traditional form of religion, and the mainstream 
Sunni interpretations of Diyanet, which repels the modern, 
puritan interpretations that are frequently advocated by 
Islamist movements . However, given “overtly political” 
turn that Diyanet is taking, (Fabbe, 2016: 12-16) there 
might be backlash or some lasting changes in the region .
The components of Hatay’s social fabric, and the ways 
in which religion is incorporated into the social life 
also serve as a salient barrier that, at a minimum, slows 
down the penetration of Islamist political movements in 
this province . Similar to Trakya, Hatay residents do not 
automatically fit the elite/secular profile either . However, 
while Trakya enjoys relative ethno-national and religious 
homogeneity, the opposite quality in Hatay shapes the 
social fabric of the province . Residents of Hatay pride 
themselves for having harmonious relations for centuries, 
despite their incredible ethnic, national, and religious 
diversity . Many of its residents are fluent in Arabic . 
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Intermarriage among Muslims and non-Muslims, as well 
as among Sunnis and Alevis is not uncommon . People 
talk about a “delicate balance” that has been historically 
sustained in the region that enables each group to respect 
each other and mutually thrive . (Celik Wiltse, 2016) 
In terms of their socio-economic outlook, Antakya, 
Iskenderun, Arsuz and Samandag all have vibrant 
communities with strong tourism and service sectors, 
renowned local cuisines, and a strong tradition of 
entertainment . Even the ongoing civil war in neighboring 
Syria does not seem to have dampened the nightlife 
in many of these cities . Compared to its conservative 
neighbors to the north, Hatay is more open, socially less 
restrictive, and overall, more accommodating of diversity 
and heterodoxy . 
Having established strong footholds in the region, 
particularly in Gaziantep, Adiyaman and Urfa, the 
ruling AKP has been consistently flexing its muscles in 
Hatay, to gain electoral support . Many locals lament 
that it tries to do so by rocking the “delicate balances” 
in Hatay, and pitting the ethno-religious groups against 
each other . For example, prominent CHP politician 
and party spokesperson3 Selin Sayek Böke of Antakya 
was systematically harassed for her Christian heritage . 
(Haberturk, 2016) Locals state that in Hatay (population 
1 .5 million), most people knew the faith of their neighbors, 
but it was considered vulgar to express it publicly, let alone 
use it for political gain . However, since the AKP came to 
power, they claim each election tested ethnic and religious 
loyalties . (Celik Wiltse, 2016)
After several electoral defeats, the AKP resorted to extreme 
gerrymandering in Hatay . Three new municipalities were 
created in 2012, separating neighborhoods and villages that 
were consistently voting against the ruling party . According 
to most locals, the lines were drawn almost exclusively 
along sectarian lines, segregating the Alevis into separate 
enclaves . Defne was separated from Antakya city center . 
Neighborhoods that were long administratively and socio-
3  She quit her position as the party spokesperson over post-referendum 
controversies within the party in Spring 2017 .
economically part of Iskenderun were cut off and linked to 
the brand new administrative center of Arsuz, compelling 
people to travel 30 kilometers for basic services . Finally, 
Payas emerged arbitrarily, by dividing off the southern one-
third of Dörtyol . 
Map 2: Gerrymandering & its Impacts on 
Constitutional Referendum in Hatay
Map Authors: Dinesh Shrestha & Murat Keçeci, using 
ArcGIS 10.3. software, South Dakota State University, 
Department of Geography, September 2017. 
As the 2017 referendum results illustrate, elections 
in Hatay remain a thorn in the side of the ruling AKP . 
Gerrymandering transformed Hatay into an extremely 
polarized province . In the 2017 referendum, Defne and 
Samandag scored record high pro-CHP votes (with more 
than 90 percent voting “no”), while Yayladagi and Altinozu 
next door were staunch pro-government constituencies 
(with over 70 percent voting yes) . Despite these deliberate 
attempts to segregate the population between Sunni 
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Turkmens and the rest, the AKP could not succeed in 
winning the metropolitan municipality of Antakya . During 
my interviews, local CHP leaders stated that collectively, 
they decided to not play the “sectarian game” that the 
AKP was trying to set up . (Celik Wiltse, 2016) The CHP 
nominated an openly pious, Sunni candidate for Antakya 
mayor, despite having its strongest electoral support from 
majority Alevi districts . Yet they were able to beat the 
heavyweight AKP candidate, Justice Minister Sadullah 
Ergin in the 2014 local elections . 
The ruling party has continued to liberally apply sectarian 
pressure over Hatay . The recently established “village 
guard” (korucu) positions, which come with a rifle, steady 
paycheck and healthcare and retirement benefits, favor 
only Sunni villages . Arab Alevis of Samandag express 
growing sense of discrimination, especially in terms of 
refugee settlements practices, since the outbreak of Syrian 
civil war . Despite all the gerrymandering and sectarian 
public policies, Islamist politics have made only partial 
gains in the province . Local social dynamics and identities 
matter greatly in smaller provinces of Turkey . 
Conclusion: 
Each province offers a densely rich palette of diversity 
in Turkey . Even the most homogenous, nationalist areas 
harbor variation in terms of ethno-nationalist heritage . 
Migrants from the Balkans or the Caucasus, nomadic 
Turkmens along the Mediterranean and settled Turkmens 
of central Anatolia, the Azeris in the northeast, Kurds in the 
southeast, and the Roma in the northwest all contribute to 
complex socio-cultural dynamics at the local level . Islamist 
movements in Turkey have to negotiate their way within 
this medley of distinct communities and identities . While 
some of these collective identities might be welcoming 
towards Islamic movements and parties, others might form 
effective barriers against them . How a group collectively 
defines itself at the local level, and the predominant norms 
and values they endorse, are important indicators of their 
relative predisposition towards Islamic mobilization . The 
works of Marschall et al (2017) clearly illustrate how local 
governments in Turkey have increasingly become critical 
venues to project the predominant norms and identity 
aspects of provincial communities . 
Broad-brush explanations at the national level may not 
capture the significant variations and identity dynamics at 
the local level . Variables that may have strong explanatory 
value at the national level may not be as pliable at a local 
scale . This paper tried to illustrate that the average CHP 
voter in rural Trakya, who is fasting during Ramadan and 
probably saving money for a coveted visit to Mecca, is 
very different from the average CHP voter in Izmir . In fact, 
these two CHP voters might be very different from the 
average CHP voter in Hatay, who probably speaks fluent 
Arabic . In short, attention to local level politics offers 
significant insights . It can unpack some of the dichotomous 
ways of seeing Turkish electorate as monolithic pro-
government Islamists in the heartland versus secular elites 
along the coasts . Second, local dynamics can help explain 
why, despite all their material perks and vast organizational 
networks, Islamist movements cannot gain headway in 
certain parts of the country . If localities have distinct socio-
cultural identities that are inhospitable to political Islam 
and some economic means to resist the perks of patronage, 
they may stay outside the Islamist sphere of influence, 
despite the victory of Islamist politics at the national level . 
Comparative studies of localities that have similar socio-
economic and identity characteristics but different voting 
behavior can offer important puzzles for political analysts . 
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